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@Inproceedings { 2024_dahlmanns_lua-iot,
   title = {LUA-IoT: Let's Usably Authenticate the IoT},
   year = {2024},
   month = {11},
   day = {20},
   abstract = {Following the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), users and their devices transmit sensitive data over the Internet. For the Web, Let’s Encrypt offers a usable foundation to safeguard such data by straightforwardly issuing certificates. However, its approach is not directly applicable to the IoT as deployments lack a (dedicated) domain or miss essentials to prove domain ownership required for Let’s Encrypt. Thus, a usable approach to secure IoT deployments by properly authenticating IoT devices is missing. To close this research gap, we propose LUA-IoT, our framework to Let’s Usably Authenticate the IoT. LUA-IoT enables autonomous certificate enrollment by orienting at the success story of Let’s Encrypt, seamlessly integrating in the setup process of modern IoT devices, and relying on process steps that users already know from other domains. In the end, LUA-IoT binds the authenticity of IoT deployments to a globally valid user identifier, e.g., an email address, that is included in certificates directly issued to the IoT deployments. We exemplarily implement LUA-IoT to show that it is realizable on commodity IoT hardware and conduct a small user study indicating that LUA-IoT indeed nudges users to safeguard their devices and data (transmissions).},
   note = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)},
   tags = {internet-of-production},
   publisher = {Springer},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 27th Annual International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology (ICISC '24), November 20-22, 2024, Seoul, Korea},
   event_place = {Seoul, Korea},
   event_name = {International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology},
   event_date = {November 20-22, 2024},
   state = {accepted},
   ISSN = {0302-9743},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Pennekamp, Jan and Decker, Robin and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2024-fink-cired,
   title = {Resilient Control Center to Substation Device Communication},
   year = {2024},
   month = {11},
   day = {7},
   abstract = {Resilient communication is essential for reliably exchanging parameters and measurements in distribution systems. Thus, deploying redundant hardware for both local and wide area communication, along with protocols that leverage these redundancies for automatic and timely failovers, is fundamental. This paper presents a comprehensive overview of key protocols (PRP/HSR, MPLS-TP, and MPTCP) which offer robust recovery mechanisms. Additionally, it provides a specific concept and topology that effectively combine the presented protocols to ensure resilient communication from the control center to substation devices.},
   tags = {ven2us},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the CIRED Chicago Workshop 2024 on Resilience of Electric Distribution Systems, November 7-8, 2024, Chicago, USA},
   event_place = {Chicago},
   event_name = {CIRED Chicago Workshop 2024 on Resilience of Electric Distribution Systems},
   event_date = {November 7-8, 2024},
   state = {accepted},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Fink, Ina Berenice and Dahlmanns, Markus and Erichsen, Gerrit and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2024-dahlmanns-cired,
   title = {Reliable and Secure Control Center to Station Device Communication},
   year = {2024},
   month = {6},
   day = {19},
   abstract = {The increasing demands on the power grid require intelligent and flexible solutions that ensure the grid's stability. Many of these measures involve sophisticated communication between the control center and the stations that is not efficiently realizable using traditional protocols, e.g., IEC 60870-5-104. To this end, IEC 61850 introduces data models which allow flexible communication. Still, the specification leaves open how DSOs should interconnect their stations to realize resilient communication between the control center and station devices. However, DSOs require such communication to adapt modern solutions increasing the grid's capacity, e.g., adaptive protection systems.

In this paper, we present our envisioned network and communication concept for future DSO's ICT infrastructures that enables the control center to resiliently and flexibly communicate with station devices. For resilience, we suggest interconnecting each station with two distinct communication paths to the control center, use MPLS-TP and MPTCP for fast failovers when a single link fails, and mTLS to protect the communication possibilities against misuse. Additionally, in accordance with IEC 61850, we envision the control center to communicate with the station devices using MMS by using the station RTU as a proxy.},
   tags = {ven2us},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the CIRED workshop on Increasing Distribution Network Hosting Capacity 2024, June 19-20, 2024, Vienna, Austria},
   event_place = {Vienna},
   event_name = {CIRED workshop on Increasing Distribution Network Hosting Capacity 2024},
   event_date = {June 19-20, 2024},
   DOI = {10.1049/icp.2024.2096},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Fink, Ina Berenice and Erichsen, Gerrit and Lin, Guosong and Hammer, Thomas and Borkenhagen, Burkhard and Schneider, Sebastian and Maahsen, Christof and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2024_dahlmanns_ipv6-deployments,
   title = {Unconsidered Installations: Discovering IoT Deployments in the IPv6 Internet},
   year = {2024},
   month = {5},
   day = {10},
   abstract = {Internet-wide studies provide extremely valuable insight into how operators manage their Internet of Things (IoT) deployments in reality and often reveal grievances, e.g., significant security issues. However, while IoT devices often use IPv6, past studies resorted to comprehensively scan the IPv4 address space. To fully understand how the IoT and all its services and devices is operated, including IPv6-reachable deployments is inevitable-although scanning the entire IPv6 address space is infeasible. In this paper, we close this gap and examine how to best discover IPv6-reachable IoT deployments. To this end, we propose a methodology that allows combining various IPv6 scan direction approaches to understand the findability and prevalence of IPv6-reachable IoT deployments. Using three sources of active IPv6 addresses and eleven address generators, we discovered 6658 IoT deployments. We derive that the available address sources are a good starting point for finding IoT deployments. Additionally, we show that using two address generators is sufficient to cover most found deployments and save time as well as resources. Assessing the security of the deployments, we surprisingly find similar issues as in the IPv4 Internet, although IPv6 deployments might be newer and generally more up-to-date: Only 39\% of deployments have access control in place and only 6.2\% make use of TLS inviting attackers, e.g., to eavesdrop sensitive data.},
   keywords = {Internet of Things, security, Internet measurements, IPv6, address generators},
   tags = {internet-of-production},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2024/2024-dahlmanns-ipv6.pdf},
   publisher = {IEEE},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2024 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS '24), May 6-10, 2024, Seoul, Korea},
   event_place = {Seoul, Korea},
   event_name = {2024 IEEE Network Operations and Management Symposium},
   event_date = {May 6-10, 2024},
   DOI = {10.1109/NOMS59830.2024.10574963},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Heidenreich, Felix and Lohm{\"o}ller, Johannes and Pennekamp, Jan and Wehrle, Klaus and Henze, Martin}
}

@Inproceedings { 2024-dahlmanns-doctoralsym,
   title = {Protocol Security in the Industrial Internet of Things},
   year = {2024},
   month = {5},
   day = {10},
   abstract = {Advances like Industry 4.0 lead to a rising number of Internet-connected industrial deployments and thus an Industrial Internet of Things with growing attack vectors. To uphold a secure and safe operation of these deployments, industrial protocols nowadays include security features, e.g., end-to-end secure communication. However, so far, it is unclear how well these features are used in practice and which obstacles might prevent operators from securely running their deployments. In this research description paper, we summarize our recent research activities to close this gap. Specifically, we show that even secure-by-design protocols are by far no guarantee for secure deployments. Instead, many deployments still open the doors for eavesdropping attacks or malicious takeovers. Additionally, we give an outlook on how to overcome identified obstacles allowing operators to configure their deployments more securely.},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2024/2024-dahlmanns-disssymposium.pdf},
   publisher = {IEEE},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2024 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS '24), May 6-10, 2024, Seoul, Korea},
   event_place = {Seoul, Korea},
   event_name = {2024 IEEE Network Operations and Management Symposium},
   event_date = {May 6-10, 2024},
   DOI = {10.1109/NOMS59830.2024.10575096},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Poster { 2024-dahlmanns-sul,
   title = {Poster: Trusted Execution Environment-basierte Sicherheit für digitale Umspannwerke},
   year = {2024},
   month = {3},
   day = {5},
   number = {19},
   tags = {ven2us},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2024/2024-dahlmanns-slt.pdf},
   organization = {VDE ETG/FNN-Tutorial 2024 Schutz- und Leittechnik, March 05-06, 2024, Leipzig, Germany},
   event_place = {Leipzig, Germany},
   event_name = {VDE ETG/FNN-Tutorial 2024 Schutz- und Leittechnik},
   event_date = {March 05-06, 2024},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Wark, Andreas and Genzel, Carl-Heinz and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Poster { 2024-fink-sul,
   title = {Poster: Resiliente Kommunikation f{\"u}r die Fernwirktechnik in digitalen Umspannwerken},
   year = {2024},
   month = {3},
   day = {5},
   number = {19},
   tags = {ven2us},
   organization = {VDE ETG/FNN-Tutorial 2024 Schutz- und Leittechnik, March 05-06, 2024, Leipzig, Germany},
   event_place = {Leipzig, Germany},
   event_name = {VDE ETG/FNN-Tutorial 2024 Schutz- und Leittechnik},
   event_date = {March 05-06, 2024},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Fink, Ina Berenice and Dahlmanns, Markus and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2024-dahlmanns-fps,
   title = {Collectively Enhancing IoT Security: A Privacy-Aware Crowd-Sourcing Approach},
   year = {2024},
   volume = {14551},
   abstract = {Security configurations remain challenging for trained administrators. Nowadays, due to the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), untrained users operate numerous and heterogeneous Internet-facing services in manifold use case-specific scenarios. In this work, we close the growing gap between the complexity of IoT security configuration and the expertise of the affected users. To this end, we propose ColPSA, a platform for collective and privacy-aware security advice that allows users to optimize their configuration by exchanging information about what security can be realized given their IoT deployment and scenario.},
   editor = {Mohamed Mosbah, Florence S{\`e}des, Nadia Tawbi, Toufik Ahmed, Nora Boulahia-Cuppens, Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro},
   publisher = {Springer Cham},
   series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Foundations and Practice of Security (FPS '23), December 11-13, 2023, Bordeaux, France},
   event_place = {Bordeaux, France},
   event_name = {International Symposium on Foundations and Practice of Security 2023 (FPS 23)},
   event_date = {December 11-13, 2023},
   DOI = {10.1007/978-3-031-57540-2_2},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Matzutt, Roman and Dax, Chris and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2023_lohmoeller_transparency,
   title = {Poster: Bridging Trust Gaps: Data Usage Transparency in Federated Data Ecosystems},
   year = {2023},
   month = {11},
   day = {27},
   keywords = {data usage control; data ecosystems; transparency logs},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2023/2023-lohmoeller-transparency.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’23), November 26-30, 2023, Copenhagen, Denmark},
   event_place = {Copenhagen, Denmark},
   event_date = {November 26-30, 2023},
   ISBN = {979-8-4007-0050-7/23/11},
   DOI = {10.1145/3576915.3624371},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Lohm{\"o}ller, Johannes and Vlad, Eduard and Dahlmanns, Markus and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Article { 2023_pennekamp_purchase_inquiries,
   title = {Offering Two-Way Privacy for Evolved Purchase Inquiries},
   journal = {ACM Transactions on Internet Technology},
   year = {2023},
   month = {11},
   day = {17},
   volume = {23},
   number = {4},
   abstract = {Dynamic and flexible business relationships are expected to become more important in the future to accommodate specialized change requests or small-batch production. Today, buyers and sellers must disclose sensitive information on products upfront before the actual manufacturing. However, without a trust relation, this situation is precarious for the involved companies as they fear for their competitiveness. Related work overlooks this issue so far: Existing approaches only protect the information of a single party only, hindering dynamic and on-demand business relationships. To account for the corresponding research gap of inadequately privacy-protected information and to deal with companies without an established trust relation, we pursue the direction of innovative privacy-preserving purchase inquiries that seamlessly integrate into today's established supplier management and procurement processes. Utilizing well-established building blocks from private computing, such as private set intersection and homomorphic encryption, we propose two designs with slightly different privacy and performance implications to securely realize purchase inquiries over the Internet. In particular, we allow buyers to consider more potential sellers without sharing sensitive information and relieve sellers of the burden of repeatedly preparing elaborate yet discarded offers. We demonstrate our approaches' scalability using two real-world use cases from the domain of production technology. Overall, we present deployable designs that offer two-way privacy for purchase inquiries and, in turn, fill a gap that currently hinders establishing dynamic and flexible business relationships. In the future, we expect significantly increasing research activity in this overlooked area to address the needs of an evolving production landscape.},
   keywords = {bootstrapping procurement; secure industrial collaboration; private set intersection; homomorphic encryption; Internet of Production},
   tags = {internet-of-production},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2023/2023-pennekamp-purchase-inquiries.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   ISSN = {1533-5399},
   DOI = {10.1145/3599968},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Dahlmanns, Markus and Fuhrmann, Frederik and Heutmann, Timo and Kreppein, Alexander and Grunert, Dennis and Lange, Christoph and Schmitt, Robert H. and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2023-dahlmanns-docker,
   title = {Secrets Revealed in Container Images: An Internet-wide Study on Occurrence and Impact},
   year = {2023},
   month = {7},
   day = {10},
   pages = {797-811},
   abstract = {Containerization allows bundling applications and their dependencies into a single image. The containerization framework Docker eases the use of this concept and enables sharing images publicly, gaining high momentum. However, it can lead to users creating and sharing images that include private keys or API secrets—either by mistake or out of negligence. This leakage impairs the creator's security and that of everyone using the image. Yet, the extent of this practice and how to counteract it remains unclear.

In this paper, we analyze 337,171 images from Docker Hub and 8,076 other private registries unveiling that 8.5\% of images indeed include secrets. Specifically, we find 52,107 private keys and 3,158 leaked API secrets, both opening a large attack surface, i.e., putting authentication and confidentiality of privacy-sensitive data at stake and even allow active attacks. We further document that those leaked keys are used in the wild: While we discovered 1,060 certificates relying on compromised keys being issued by public certificate authorities, based on further active Internet measurements, we find 275,269 TLS and SSH hosts using leaked private keys for authentication. To counteract this issue, we discuss how our methodology can be used to prevent secret leakage and reuse.},
   keywords = {network security; security configuration; secret leakage; container},
   tags = {ven2us, internet-of-production,},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2023/2023-dahlmanns-asiaccs.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2023 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS '23), July 10-14, 2023, Melbourne, VIC, Australia},
   event_place = {Melbourne, VIC, Australia},
   event_name = {ASIA CCS '23},
   event_date = {July 10-14, 2023},
   ISBN = {979-8-4007-0098-9/23/07},
   DOI = {10.1145/3579856.3590329},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Sander, Constantin and Decker, Robin and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Incollection { 2023_pennekamp_crd-a.i,
   title = {Evolving the Digital Industrial Infrastructure for Production: Steps Taken and the Road Ahead},
   year = {2023},
   month = {2},
   day = {8},
   pages = {35-60},
   abstract = {The Internet of Production (IoP) leverages concepts such as digital shadows, data lakes, and a World Wide Lab (WWL) to advance today’s production. Consequently, it requires a technical infrastructure that can support the agile deployment of these concepts and corresponding high-level applications, which, e.g., demand the processing of massive data in motion and at rest. As such, key research aspects are the support for low-latency control loops, concepts on scalable data stream processing, deployable information security, and semantically rich and efficient long-term storage. In particular, such an infrastructure cannot continue to be limited to machines and sensors, but additionally needs to encompass networked environments: production cells, edge computing, and location-independent cloud infrastructures. Finally, in light of the envisioned WWL, i.e., the interconnection of production sites, the technical infrastructure must be advanced to support secure and privacy-preserving industrial collaboration. To evolve today’s production sites and lay the infrastructural foundation for the IoP, we identify five broad streams of research: (1) adapting data and stream processing to heterogeneous data from distributed sources, (2) ensuring data interoperability between systems and production sites, (3) exchanging and sharing data with different stakeholders, (4) network security approaches addressing the risks of increasing interconnectivity, and (5) security architectures to enable secure and privacy-preserving industrial collaboration. With our research, we evolve the underlying infrastructure from isolated, sparsely networked production sites toward an architecture that supports high-level applications and sophisticated digital shadows while facilitating the transition toward a WWL.},
   keywords = {Cyber-physical production systems; Data streams; Industrial data processing; Industrial network security; Industrial data security; Secure industrial collaboration},
   tags = {internet-of-production},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2023/2023-pennekamp-iop-a.i.pdf},
   publisher = {Springer},
   series = {Interdisciplinary Excellence Accelerator Series},
   booktitle = {Internet of Production: Fundamentals, Applications and Proceedings},
   ISBN = {978-3-031-44496-8},
   DOI = {10.1007/978-3-031-44497-5_2},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Belova, Anastasiia and Bergs, Thomas and Bodenbenner, Matthias and B{\"u}hrig-Polaczek, Andreas and Dahlmanns, Markus and Kunze, Ike and Kr{\"o}ger, Moritz and Geisler, Sandra and Henze, Martin and L{\"u}tticke, Daniel and Montavon, Benjamin and Niemietz, Philipp and Ortjohann, Lucia and Rudack, Maximilian and Schmitt, Robert H. and Vroomen, Uwe and Wehrle, Klaus and Zeng, Michael}
}

@Inproceedings { 2023-lorz-cired,
   title = {Interconnected grid protection systems - reference grid for testing an adaptive protection scheme},
   year = {2023},
   pages = {3286-3290},
   tags = {ven2us},
   booktitle = {27th International Conference on Electricity Distribution (CIRED 2023), Rome, Italy, June 12-15, 2023},
   event_place = {Rome, Italy},
   event_name = {International Conference \& Exhibition on Electricity Distribution (CIRED)},
   event_date = {June 12-15, 2023},
   DOI = {10.1049/icp.2023.0864},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Lorz, Tobias and Jaeger, Johann and Selimaj, Antigona and Hacker, Immanuel and Ulbig, Andreas and Heckel, Jan-Peter and Becker, Christian and Dahlmanns, Markus and Fink, Ina Berenice and Wehrle, Klaus and Erichsen, Gerrit and Schindler, Michael and Luxenburger, Rainer and Lin, Guosong}
}

@Inproceedings { 2022_dahlmanns_tlsiiot,
   title = {Missed Opportunities: Measuring the Untapped TLS Support in the Industrial Internet of Things},
   year = {2022},
   month = {5},
   day = {31},
   pages = {252-266},
   abstract = {The ongoing trend to move industrial appliances from previously isolated networks to the Internet requires fundamental changes in security to uphold secure and safe operation. Consequently, to ensure end-to-end secure communication and authentication, (i) traditional industrial protocols, e.g., Modbus, are retrofitted with TLS support, and (ii) modern protocols, e.g., MQTT, are directly designed to use TLS. To understand whether these changes indeed lead to secure Industrial Internet of Things deployments, i.e., using TLS-based protocols, which are configured according to security best practices, we perform an Internet-wide security assessment of ten industrial protocols covering the complete IPv4 address space.
Our results show that both, retrofitted existing protocols and newly developed secure alternatives, are barely noticeable in the wild. While we find that new protocols have a higher TLS adoption rate than traditional protocols (7.2 \% vs. 0.4 \%), the overall adoption of TLS is comparably low (6.5 \% of hosts). Thus, most industrial deployments (934,736 hosts) are insecurely connected to the Internet. Furthermore, we identify that 42 \% of hosts with TLS support (26,665 hosts) show security deficits, e.g., missing access control. Finally, we show that support in configuring systems securely, e.g., via configuration templates, is promising to strengthen security.},
   keywords = {industrial communication; network security; security configuration},
   tags = {internet-of-production, rfc},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2022/2022-dahlmanns-asiaccs.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS '22), May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan},
   event_place = {Nagasaki, Japan},
   event_name = {ASIACCS '22},
   event_date = {May 30-June 3, 2022},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-9140-5/22/05},
   DOI = {10.1145/3488932.3497762},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Lohm{\"o}ller, Johannes and Pennekamp, Jan and Bodenhausen, J{\"o}rn and Wehrle, Klaus and Henze, Martin}
}

@Inproceedings { 2022_kus_iids_generalizability,
   title = {A False Sense of Security? Revisiting the State of Machine Learning-Based Industrial Intrusion Detection},
   year = {2022},
   month = {5},
   day = {30},
   pages = {73-84},
   abstract = {Anomaly-based intrusion detection promises to detect novel or unknown attacks on industrial control systems by modeling expected system behavior and raising corresponding alarms for any deviations. As manually creating these behavioral models is tedious and error-prone, research focuses on machine learning to train them automatically, achieving detection rates upwards of 99 \%. However, these approaches are typically trained not only on benign traffic but also on attacks and then evaluated against the same type of attack used for training. Hence, their actual, real-world performance on unknown (not trained on) attacks remains unclear. In turn, the reported near-perfect detection rates of machine learning-based intrusion detection might create a false sense of security. To assess this situation and clarify the real potential of machine learning-based industrial intrusion detection, we develop an evaluation methodology and examine multiple approaches from literature for their performance on unknown attacks (excluded from training). Our results highlight an ineffectiveness in detecting unknown attacks, with detection rates dropping to between 3.2 \% and 14.7 \% for some types of attacks. Moving forward, we derive recommendations for further research on machine learning-based approaches to ensure clarity on their ability to detect unknown attacks.},
   keywords = {anomaly detection; machine learning; industrial control system},
   tags = {internet-of-production, rfc},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2022/2022-kus-iids-generalizability.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th ACM Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop (CPSS '22), co-located with the 17th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS '22), May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-9176-4/22/05},
   DOI = {10.1145/3494107.3522773},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Kus, Dominik and Wagner, Eric and Pennekamp, Jan and Wolsing, Konrad and Fink, Ina Berenice and Dahlmanns, Markus and Wehrle, Klaus and Henze, Martin}
}

@Inproceedings { 2022-lorenz-ven2us,
   title = {Interconnected network protection systems - the basis for the reliable and safe operation of distribution grids with a high penetration of renewable energies and electric vehicle},
   year = {2022},
   abstract = {Power grids are increasingly faced with the introduction of decentralized, highly volatile power supplies from renewable energies and high loads occurring from e-mobility. However, today’s static grid protection cannot manage all upcoming conditions while providing a high level of dependability and security. It forms a bottleneck of a future decarbonizing grid development. 

In our research project, we develop and verify an adaptive grid protection algorithm. It calculates situation dependent protection parameters for the event of power flow shifts and topology changes caused by volatile power supplies due to the increase of renewable generation and the rapid expansion of e-mobility. As a result the distribution grid can be operated with the optimally adapted protection parameters and functions for changing operating states. To safely adjust the values on protection hardware in the field, i.e., safe from hardware failures and cyberattacks, we research resilient and secure communication concepts for the adaptive and interconnected grid protection system. Finally, we validate our concept and system by demonstrations in the laboratory and field tests.},
   tags = {ven2us},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the CIRED workshop on E-mobility and power distribution systems 2022, June 2-3, 2022, Porto, Portugal},
   event_place = {Porto},
   event_name = {CIRED workshop on E-mobility and power distribution systems 2022},
   event_date = {June 2-3, 2022},
   DOI = {10.1049/icp.2022.0768},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Lorenz, Matthias and Pletzer, Tobias Markus and Schuhmacher, Malte and Sowa, Torsten and Dahms, Michael and Stock, Simon and Babazadeh, Davood and Becker, Christian and Jaeger, Johann and Lorz, Tobias and Dahlmanns, Markus and Fink, Ina Berenice and Wehrle, Klaus and Ulbig, Andreas and Linnartz, Philipp and Selimaj, Antigona and Offergeld, Thomas}
}

@Inproceedings { 2021_pennekamp_laser,
   title = {Collaboration is not Evil: A Systematic Look at Security Research for Industrial Use},
   year = {2021},
   month = {12},
   day = {21},
   abstract = {Following the recent Internet of Things-induced trends on digitization in general, industrial applications will further evolve as well. With a focus on the domains of manufacturing and production, the Internet of Production pursues the vision of a digitized, globally interconnected, yet secure environment by establishing a distributed knowledge base.
Background. As part of our collaborative research of advancing the scope of industrial applications through cybersecurity and privacy, we identified a set of common challenges and pitfalls that surface in such applied interdisciplinary collaborations.
Aim. Our goal with this paper is to support researchers in the emerging field of cybersecurity in industrial settings by formalizing our experiences as reference for other research efforts, in industry and academia alike.
Method. Based on our experience, we derived a process cycle of performing such interdisciplinary research, from the initial idea to the eventual dissemination and paper writing. This presented methodology strives to successfully bootstrap further research and to encourage further work in this emerging area.
Results. Apart from our newly proposed process cycle, we report on our experiences and conduct a case study applying this methodology, raising awareness for challenges in cybersecurity research for industrial applications. We further detail the interplay between our process cycle and the data lifecycle in applied research data management. Finally, we augment our discussion with an industrial as well as an academic view on this research area and highlight that both areas still have to overcome significant challenges to sustainably and securely advance industrial applications.
Conclusions. With our proposed process cycle for interdisciplinary research in the intersection of cybersecurity and industrial application, we provide a foundation for further research. We look forward to promising research initiatives, projects, and directions that emerge based on our methodological work.},
   tags = {internet-of-production},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2021/2021-pennekamp-laser-collaboration.pdf},
   publisher = {ACSA},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the Workshop on Learning from Authoritative Security Experiment Results (LASER '20), co-located with the 36th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '20), December 7-11, 2020, Austin, TX, USA},
   event_place = {Austin, TX, USA},
   event_name = {Learning from Authoritative Security Experiment Results (LASER '20)},
   event_date = {December 8, 2020},
   ISBN = {978-1-891562-81-5},
   DOI = {10.14722/laser-acsac.2020.23088},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Buchholz, Erik and Dahlmanns, Markus and Kunze, Ike and Braun, Stefan and Wagner, Eric and Brockmann, Matthias and Wehrle, Klaus and Henze, Martin}
}

@Inproceedings { 2021_pennekamp_bootstrapping,
   title = {Confidential Computing-Induced Privacy Benefits for the Bootstrapping of New Business Relationships},
   year = {2021},
   month = {11},
   day = {15},
   number = {RWTH-2021-09499},
   abstract = {In addition to quality improvements and cost reductions, dynamic and flexible business relationships are expected to become more important in the future to account for specific customer change requests or small-batch production. Today, despite reservation, sensitive information must be shared upfront between buyers and sellers. However, without a trust relation, this situation is precarious for the involved companies as they fear for their competitiveness following information leaks or breaches of their privacy. To address this issue, the concepts of confidential computing and cloud computing come to mind as they promise to offer scalable approaches that preserve the privacy of participating companies. In particular, designs building on confidential computing can help to technically enforce privacy. Moreover, cloud computing constitutes an elegant design choice to scale these novel protocols to industry needs while limiting the setup and management overhead for practitioners. Thus, novel approaches in this area can advance the status quo of bootstrapping new relationships as they provide privacy-preserving alternatives that are suitable for immediate deployment.},
   keywords = {bootstrapping procurement; business relationships; secure industrial collaboration; privacy; Internet of Production},
   tags = {internet-of-production},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2021/2021-pennekamp-bootstrapping.pdf},
   publisher = {RWTH Aachen University},
   booktitle = {Blitz Talk at the 2021 Cloud Computing Security Workshop (CCSW '21), co-located with the 28th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '21), November 15-19, 2021, Seoul, Korea},
   institution = {RWTH Aachen University},
   event_place = {Seoul, Korea},
   event_date = {November 14, 2021},
   DOI = {10.18154/RWTH-2021-09499},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Fuhrmann, Frederik and Dahlmanns, Markus and Heutmann, Timo and Kreppein, Alexander and Grunert, Dennis and Lange, Christoph and Schmitt, Robert H. and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2021_dahlmanns_entrust,
   title = {Transparent End-to-End Security for Publish/Subscribe Communication in Cyber-Physical Systems},
   year = {2021},
   month = {4},
   day = {28},
   pages = {78–87},
   abstract = {The ongoing digitization of industrial manufacturing leads to a decisive change in industrial communication paradigms. Moving from traditional one-to-one to many-to-many communication, publish/subscribe systems promise a more dynamic and efficient exchange of data. However, the resulting significantly more complex communication relationships render traditional end-to-end security futile for sufficiently protecting the sensitive and safety-critical data transmitted in industrial systems. Most notably, the central message brokers inherent in publish/subscribe systems introduce a designated weak spot for security as they can access all communication messages. To address this issue, we propose ENTRUST, a novel solution for key server-based end-to-end security in publish/subscribe systems. ENTRUST transparently realizes confidentiality, integrity, and authentication for publish/subscribe systems without any modification of the underlying protocol. We exemplarily implement ENTRUST on top of MQTT, the de-facto standard for machine-to-machine communication, showing that ENTRUST can integrate seamlessly into existing publish/subscribe systems.},
   keywords = {cyber-physical system security; publish-subscribe security; end-to-end security},
   tags = {internet-of-production, rfc},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2021/2021-dahlmanns-entrust.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Secure and Trustworthy Cyber-Physical Systems (SaT-CPS '21), co-located with the 11th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY '21), April 26-28, 2021, Virtual Event, USA},
   event_place = {Virtual Event, USA},
   event_name = {ACM Workshop on Secure and Trustworthy Cyber-Physical Systems},
   event_date = {April 28, 2021},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-8319-6/21/04},
   DOI = {10.1145/3445969.3450423},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Pennekamp, Jan and Fink, Ina Berenice and Schoolmann, Bernd and Wehrle, Klaus and Henze, Martin}
}

@Inproceedings { 2020_pennekamp_parameter_exchange,
   title = {Privacy-Preserving Production Process Parameter Exchange},
   year = {2020},
   month = {12},
   day = {10},
   pages = {510-525},
   abstract = {Nowadays, collaborations between industrial companies always go hand in hand with trust issues, i.e., exchanging valuable production data entails the risk of improper use of potentially sensitive information. Therefore, companies hesitate to offer their production data, e.g., process parameters that would allow other companies to establish new production lines faster, against a quid pro quo. Nevertheless, the expected benefits of industrial collaboration, data exchanges, and the utilization of external knowledge are significant.
In this paper, we introduce our Bloom filter-based Parameter Exchange (BPE), which enables companies to exchange process parameters privacy-preservingly. We demonstrate the applicability of our platform based on two distinct real-world use cases: injection molding and machine tools. We show that BPE is both scalable and deployable for different needs to foster industrial collaborations. Thereby, we reward data-providing companies with payments while preserving their valuable data and reducing the risks of data leakage.},
   keywords = {secure industrial collaboration; Bloom filter; oblivious transfer; Internet of Production},
   tags = {internet-of-production},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-parameter-exchange.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 36th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '20), December 7-11, 2020, Austin, TX, USA},
   event_place = {Austin, TX, USA},
   event_date = {December 7-11, 2020},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-8858-0/20/12},
   DOI = {10.1145/3427228.3427248},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Buchholz, Erik and Lockner, Yannik and Dahlmanns, Markus and Xi, Tiandong and Fey, Marcel and Brecher, Christian and Hopmann, Christian and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua,
   title = {Easing the Conscience with OPC UA: An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure Deployments},
   year = {2020},
   month = {10},
   day = {27},
   pages = {101-110},
   abstract = {Due to increasing digitalization, formerly isolated industrial networks, e.g., for factory and process automation, move closer and closer to the Internet, mandating secure communication. However, securely setting up OPC UA, the prime candidate for secure industrial communication, is challenging due to a large variety of insecure options. To study whether Internet-facing OPC UA appliances are configured securely, we actively scan the IPv4 address space for publicly reachable OPC UA systems and assess the security of their configurations. We observe problematic security configurations such as missing access control (on 24\% of hosts), disabled security functionality (24\%), or use of deprecated cryptographic primitives (25\%) on in total 92\% of the reachable deployments. Furthermore, we discover several hundred devices in multiple autonomous systems sharing the same security certificate, opening the door for impersonation attacks. Overall, in this paper, we highlight commonly found security misconfigurations and underline the importance of appropriate configuration for security-featuring protocols.},
   keywords = {industrial communication; network security; security configuration},
   tags = {internet-of-production, rfc},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-dahlmanns-imc-opcua.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference (IMC '20), October 27-29, 2020, Pittsburgh, PA, USA},
   event_place = {Pittsburgh, PA, USA},
   event_name = {ACM Internet Measurement Conference 2020},
   event_date = {October 27-29, 2020},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-8138-3/20/10},
   DOI = {10.1145/3419394.3423666},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Lohm{\"o}ller, Johannes and Fink, Ina Berenice and Pennekamp, Jan and Wehrle, Klaus and Henze, Martin}
}

@Inproceedings { 2020_roepert_opcua,
   title = {Assessing the Security of OPC UA Deployments},
   year = {2020},
   month = {4},
   day = {2},
   abstract = {To address the increasing security demands of industrial deployments, OPC UA is one of the first industrial protocols explicitly designed with security in mind. However, deploying it securely requires a thorough configuration of a wide range of options. Thus, assessing the security of OPC UA deployments and their configuration is necessary to ensure secure operation, most importantly confidentiality and integrity of industrial processes. In this work, we present extensions to the popular Metasploit Framework to ease network-based security assessments of OPC UA deployments. To this end, we discuss methods to discover OPC UA servers, test their authentication, obtain their configuration, and check for vulnerabilities. Ultimately, our work enables operators to verify the (security) configuration of their systems and identify potential attack vectors.},
   tags = {internet-of-production, rfc},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-roepert-opcua-security.pdf},
   misc2 = {en},
   publisher = {University of T{\"u}bingen},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st ITG Workshop on IT Security (ITSec '20), April 2-3, 2020, T{\"u}bingen, Germany},
   event_place = {T{\"u}bingen, Germany},
   event_date = {April 2-3, 2020},
   DOI = {10.15496/publikation-41813},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Roepert, Linus and Dahlmanns, Markus and Fink, Ina Berenice and Pennekamp, Jan and Henze, Martin}
}

@Inproceedings { 2019_pennekamp_securityConsiderations,
   title = {Security Considerations for Collaborations in an Industrial IoT-based Lab of Labs},
   year = {2019},
   month = {12},
   day = {4},
   abstract = {The productivity and sustainability advances for (smart) manufacturing resulting from (globally) interconnected Industrial IoT devices in a lab of labs are expected to be significant. While such visions introduce opportunities for the involved parties, the associated risks must be considered as well. In particular, security aspects are crucial challenges and remain unsolved. So far, single stakeholders only had to consider their local view on security. However, for a global lab, we identify several fundamental research challenges in (dynamic) scenarios with multiple stakeholders: While information security mandates that models must be adapted wrt. confidentiality to address these new influences on business secrets, from a network perspective, the drastically increasing amount of possible attack vectors challenges today's approaches. Finally, concepts addressing these security challenges should provide backwards compatibility to enable a smooth transition from today's isolated landscape towards globally interconnected IIoT environments.},
   keywords = {secure industrial collaboration; interconnected cyber-physical systems; stakeholders; Internet of Production},
   tags = {internet-of-production; iotrust},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-pennekamp-security-considerations.pdf},
   publisher = {IEEE},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE Global Conference on Internet of Things (GCIoT '19), December 4–7, 2019, Dubai, United Arab Emirates},
   event_place = {Dubai, United Arab Emirates},
   event_date = {December 4–7, 2019},
   ISBN = {978-1-7281-4873-1},
   DOI = {10.1109/GCIoT47977.2019.9058413},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Dahlmanns, Markus and Gleim, Lars and Decker, Stefan and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2019-hiller-icnp-tailoringOR,
   title = {Tailoring Onion Routing to the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy in Untrusted Environments},
   year = {2019},
   month = {10},
   day = {10},
   abstract = {An increasing number of IoT scenarios involve mobile, resource-constrained IoT devices that rely on untrusted networks for Internet connectivity. In such environments, attackers can derive sensitive private information of IoT device owners, e.g., daily routines or secret supply chain procedures, when sniffing on IoT communication and linking IoT devices and owner. Furthermore, untrusted networks do not provide IoT devices with any protection against attacks from the Internet. Anonymous communication using onion routing provides a well-proven mechanism to keep the relationship between communication partners secret and (optionally) protect against network attacks. However, the application of onion routing is challenged by protocol incompatibilities and demanding cryptographic processing on constrained IoT devices, rendering its use infeasible. To close this gap, we tailor onion routing to the IoT by bridging protocol incompatibilities and offloading expensive cryptographic processing to a router or web server of the IoT device owner. Thus, we realize resource-conserving access control and end-to-end security for IoT devices. To prove applicability, we deploy onion routing for the IoT within the well-established Tor network enabling IoT devices to leverage its resources to achieve the same grade of anonymity as readily available to traditional devices.},
   tags = {internet-of-production},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-hiller-tailoring.pdf},
   publisher = {IEEE},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 27th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP '19), October 7-10, 2019, Chicago, IL, USA},
   event_place = {Chicago, IL, USA},
   event_name = {27th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP 2019)},
   event_date = {7-10. Oct. 2019},
   ISBN = {978-1-7281-2700-2},
   ISSN = {2643-3303},
   DOI = {10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888033},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Hiller, Jens and Pennekamp, Jan and Dahlmanns, Markus and Henze, Martin and Panchenko, Andriy and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2019-dahlmanns-icnp-knowledgeSystem,
   title = {Privacy-Preserving Remote Knowledge System},
   year = {2019},
   month = {10},
   day = {7},
   abstract = {More and more traditional services, such as malware detectors or collaboration services in industrial scenarios, move to the cloud. However, this behavior poses a risk for the privacy of clients since these services are able to generate profiles containing very sensitive information, e.g., vulnerability information or collaboration partners. Hence, a rising need for protocols that enable clients to obtain knowledge without revealing their requests exists. To address this issue, we propose a protocol that enables clients (i) to query large cloud-based knowledge systems in a privacy-preserving manner using Private Set Intersection and (ii) to subsequently obtain individual knowledge items without leaking the client’s requests via few Oblivious Transfers. With our preliminary design, we allow clients to save a significant amount of time in comparison to performing Oblivious Transfers only.},
   note = {Poster Session},
   keywords = {private query protocol; knowledge system; remote knowledge; private set intersection; oblivious  transfer},
   tags = {kimusin; internet-of-production},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-dahlmanns-knowledge-system.pdf},
   publisher = {IEEE},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 27th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP '19), October 7-10, 2019, Chicago, IL, USA},
   event_place = {Chicago, IL, USA},
   event_name = {27th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP 2019)},
   event_date = {7-10. Oct. 2019},
   ISBN = {978-1-7281-2700-2},
   ISSN = {2643-3303},
   DOI = {10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888121},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus and Dax, Chris and Matzutt, Roman and Pennekamp, Jan and Hiller, Jens and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Inproceedings { 2019-hiller-aeit-regaining,
   title = {Regaining Insight and Control on SMGW-based Secure Communication in Smart Grids},
   year = {2019},
   month = {9},
   abstract = {Smart Grids require extensive communication to enable safe and stable energy supply in the age of decentralized and dynamic energy production and consumption. To protect the communication in this critical infrastructure, public authorities mandate smart meter gateways (SMGWs) to intercept all inbound and outbound communication of premises such as a factory or smart home, and forward the communication data on secure channels established by the SMGW itself to be in control of the communication security. However, using the SMGW as proxy, local devices can neither review the security of these remote connections established by the SMGW nor enforce higher security guarantees than established by the all in one configuration of the SMGW which does not allow for use case-specific security settings. We present mechanisms that enable local devices to regain this insight and control over the full connection, i.e., up to the final receiver, while retaining the SMGW's ability to ensure a suitable security level. Our evaluation shows modest computation and transmission overheads for this increased security in the critical smart grid infrastructure.},
   note = {ECSEL; European Union (EU); Horizon 2020; CONNECT Innovative smart components, modules and appliances for a truly connected, efficient and secure smart grid; Grant Agreement No 737434},
   tags = {connect},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-hiller-aeit-regaining.pdf},
   publisher = {IEEE},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2019 AEIT International Annual Conference, September 18-20, 2019, Firenze, Italy},
   event_place = {Firenze, Italy},
   event_name = {AEIT International Annual Conference},
   event_date = {September 18-20, 2019},
   ISBN = {978-8-8872-3745-0},
   DOI = {10.23919/AEIT.2019.8893406},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Hiller, Jens and Komanns, Karsten and Dahlmanns, Markus and Wehrle, Klaus}
}

@Thesis { 2018_dahlmanns_tor4iot,
   title = {Anonymity for the Tiny: Realizing Tor for the Internet of 
Things},
   year = {2018},
   month = {9},
   day = {28},
   school = {RWTH Aachen University},
   type = {Master Thesis},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus}
}

@Thesis { 2016_dahlmanns_santatls,
   title = {SantaTLS: TLS Support for Kernel-level Caching},
   year = {2016},
   month = {9},
   day = {26},
   school = {RWTH Aachen University},
   type = {Bachelor Thesis},
   author = {Dahlmanns, Markus}
}