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bib
--- Timezone: CEST
Creation date: 2024-07-04
Creation time: 02-32-48
--- Number of references
2
inproceedings
2020_pennekamp_parameter_exchange
Privacy-Preserving Production Process Parameter Exchange
2020
12
10
510-525
Nowadays, collaborations between industrial companies always go hand in hand with trust issues, i.e., exchanging valuable production data entails the risk of improper use of potentially sensitive information. Therefore, companies hesitate to offer their production data, e.g., process parameters that would allow other companies to establish new production lines faster, against a quid pro quo. Nevertheless, the expected benefits of industrial collaboration, data exchanges, and the utilization of external knowledge are significant.
In this paper, we introduce our Bloom filter-based Parameter Exchange (BPE), which enables companies to exchange process parameters privacy-preservingly. We demonstrate the applicability of our platform based on two distinct real-world use cases: injection molding and machine tools. We show that BPE is both scalable and deployable for different needs to foster industrial collaborations. Thereby, we reward data-providing companies with payments while preserving their valuable data and reducing the risks of data leakage.
secure industrial collaboration; Bloom filter; oblivious transfer; Internet of Production
internet-of-production
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-pennekamp-parameter-exchange.pdf
ACM
Proceedings of the 36th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '20), December 7-11, 2020, Austin, TX, USA
Austin, TX, USA
December 7-11, 2020
978-1-4503-8858-0/20/12
10.1145/3427228.3427248
1
JanPennekamp
ErikBuchholz
YannikLockner
MarkusDahlmanns
TiandongXi
MarcelFey
ChristianBrecher
ChristianHopmann
KlausWehrle
inproceedings
2020_matzutt_anonboot
Utilizing Public Blockchains for the Sybil-Resistant Bootstrapping of Distributed Anonymity Services
2020
10
7
531-542
Distributed anonymity services, such as onion routing networks or cryptocurrency tumblers, promise privacy protection without trusted third parties. While the security of these services is often well-researched, security implications of their required bootstrapping processes are usually neglected: Users either jointly conduct the anonymization themselves, or they need to rely on a set of non-colluding privacy peers. However, the typically small number of privacy peers enable single adversaries to mimic distributed services. We thus present AnonBoot, a Sybil-resistant medium to securely bootstrap distributed anonymity services via public blockchains. AnonBoot enforces that peers periodically create a small proof of work to refresh their eligibility for providing secure anonymity services. A pseudo-random, locally replicable bootstrapping process using on-chain entropy then prevents biasing the election of eligible peers. Our evaluation using Bitcoin as AnonBoot's underlying blockchain shows its feasibility to maintain a trustworthy repository of 1000 peers with only a small storage footprint while supporting arbitrarily large user bases on top of most blockchains.
anonymization; bootstrapping; public blockchain; Sybil attack; anonymity network; cryptocurrency tumbler; Bitcoin; Tor
impact_digital; digital_campus
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2020/2020-matzutt-anonboot.pdf
ACM
Proceedings of the 15th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS '20), October 5-9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan
Taipei, Taiwan
ASIACCS 2020
October 5-9, 2020
978-1-4503-6750-9/20/10
10.1145/3320269.3384729
1
RomanMatzutt
JanPennekamp
ErikBuchholz
KlausWehrle