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@Inproceedings { 2022_pennekamp_cumul,
   title = {CUMUL \& Co: High-Impact Artifacts for Website Fingerprinting Research},
   year = {2022},
   month = {12},
   day = {8},
   number = {RWTH-2022-10811},
   abstract = {Anonymous communication on the Internet is about hiding the relationship between communicating parties. At NDSS '16, we presented a new website fingerprinting approach, CUMUL, that utilizes novel features and a simple yet powerful algorithm to attack anonymization networks such as Tor. Based on pattern observation of data flows, this attack aims at identifying the content of encrypted and anonymized connections. Apart from the feature generation and the used classifier, we also provided a large dataset to the research community to study the attack at Internet scale. In this paper, we emphasize the impact of our artifacts by analyzing publications referring to our work with respect to the dataset, feature extraction method, and source code of the implementation. Based on this data, we draw conclusions about the impact of our artifacts on the research field and discuss their influence on related cybersecurity topics. Overall, from 393 unique citations, we discover more than 130 academic references that utilize our artifacts, 61 among them are highly influential (according to SemanticScholar), and at least 35 are from top-ranked security venues. This data underlines the significant relevance and impact of our work as well as of our artifacts in the community and beyond.},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2022/2022-pennekamp-cumul-artifacts.pdf},
   web_url = {https://www.acsac.org/2022/program/artifacts_competition/},
   publisher = {ACSA},
   booktitle = {Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award at 38th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '22), December 5-9, 2022, Austin, TX, USA},
   event_place = {Austin, TX, USA},
   event_name = {38th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC '22)},
   event_date = {December 5-9, 2022},
   DOI = {10.18154/RWTH-2022-10811},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Pennekamp, Jan and Henze, Martin and Zinnen, Andreas and Lanze, Fabian and Wehrle, Klaus and Panchenko, Andriy}
}

@Inproceedings { 2019_delacadena_countermeasure,
   title = {POSTER: Traffic Splitting to Counter Website Fingerprinting},
   year = {2019},
   month = {11},
   day = {12},
   pages = {2533-2535},
   abstract = {Website fingerprinting (WFP) is a special type of traffic analysis, which aims to infer the websites visited by a user. Recent studies have shown that WFP targeting Tor users is notably more effective than previously expected. Concurrently, state-of-the-art defenses have been proven to be less effective. In response, we present a novel WFP defense that splits traffic over multiple entry nodes to limit the data a single malicious entry can use. Here, we explore several traffic-splitting strategies to distribute user traffic. We establish that our weighted random strategy dramatically reduces the accuracy from nearly 95\% to less than 35\% for four state-of-the-art WFP attacks without adding any artificial delays or dummy traffic.},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-delacadena-splitting-defense.pdf},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 26th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '19), November 11-15, 2019, London, United Kingdom},
   event_place = {London, United Kingdom},
   event_date = {November 11-15, 2019},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-6747-9/19/11},
   DOI = {10.1145/3319535.3363249},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {De la Cadena, Wladimir and Mitseva, Asya and Pennekamp, Jan and Hiller, Jens and Lanze, Fabian and Engel, Thomas and Wehrle, Klaus and Panchenko, Andriy}
}

@Inproceedings { 2017-panchenko-wpes-fingerprinting,
   title = {Analysis of Fingerprinting Techniques for Tor Hidden Services},
   year = {2017},
   month = {10},
   day = {30},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2017/2017-panchenko-wpes-fingerprinting.pdf},
   misc2 = {Online},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 16th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES), co-located with the 24th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), Dallas, TX, USA},
   language = {en},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-5175-1},
   DOI = {10.1145/3139550.3139564},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Panchenko, Andriy and Mitseva, Asya and Henze, Martin and Lanze, Fabian and Wehrle, Klaus and Engel, Thomas}
}

@Inproceedings { 2016-mitseva-ccs-fingerprinting,
   title = {POSTER: Fingerprinting Tor Hidden Services},
   year = {2016},
   month = {10},
   day = {24},
   pages = {1766-1768},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2016/2016-mitseva-ccs-fingerprinting.pdf},
   misc2 = {Online},
   publisher = {ACM},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), Vienna, Austria},
   language = {en},
   ISBN = {978-1-4503-4139-4},
   DOI = {10.1145/2976749.2989054},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Mitseva, Asya and Panchenko, Andriy and Lanze, Fabian and Henze, Martin and Wehrle, Klaus and Engel, Thomas}
}

@Inproceedings { 2016-panchenko-ndss-fingerprinting,
   title = {Website Fingerprinting at Internet Scale},
   year = {2016},
   month = {2},
   day = {21},
   abstract = {The website fingerprinting attack aims to identify the content (i.e., a webpage accessed by a client) of encrypted and anonymized connections by observing patterns of data flows such as packet size and direction. This attack can be performed by a local passive eavesdropper – one of the weakest adversaries in the attacker model of anonymization networks such as Tor. In this paper, we present a novel website fingerprinting attack. Based on a simple and comprehensible idea, our approach outperforms all state-of-the-art methods in terms of classification accuracy while being computationally dramatically more efficient. In order to evaluate the severity of the website fingerprinting attack in reality, we collected the most representative dataset that has ever been built, where we avoid simplified assumptions made in the related work regarding selection and type of webpages and the size of the universe. Using this data, we explore the practical limits of website fingerprinting at Internet scale. Although our novel approach is by orders of magnitude computationally more efficient and superior in terms of detection accuracy, for the first time we show that no existing method – including our own – scales when applied in realistic settings. With our analysis, we explore neglected aspects of the attack and investigate the realistic probability of success for different strategies a real-world adversary may follow.},
   url = {https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2016/2016-panchenko-ndss-fingerprinting.pdf},
   web_url = {https://www.informatik.tu-cottbus.de/\verb=~=andriy/zwiebelfreunde/},
   publisher = {Internet Society},
   booktitle = {Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS '16), February 21-24, 2016, San Diego, CA, USA},
   event_place = {San Diego, CA, USA},
   event_date = {February 21-24, 2016},
   ISBN = {978-1-891562-41-9},
   DOI = {10.14722/ndss.2016.23477},
   reviewed = {1},
   author = {Panchenko, Andriy and Lanze, Fabian and Zinnen, Andreas and Henze, Martin and Pennekamp, Jan and Wehrle, Klaus and Engel, Thomas}
}